INSIGHTS: Early-Stage Hedge Funds- Why and How?

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The information and opinions expressed are those of Borealis and are for background purposes only, do not proport to be full or complete, and do not constitute investment advice. This discussion is for informational purposes and is not an advertisement or an offer of securities or services. Nothing contained herein should be relied upon as recommendations or advice about investing in securities. Borealis does not guarantee the accuracy of any of the information provided.

[BridgeWood] Thank you all for joining our webinar today focused on early-stage hedge fund manager due diligence. We at Bridgewood are big believers in the concept of early-stage alpha, and that newer managers oftentimes put up their best performance in their earlier years. As a result, we feel most investors should consider including early-stage managers in their investment portfolios.

However, we know that diligencing early-stage managers can be time-consuming and challenging for investors given the lack of track records, unproven ability to run their own businesses, and other factors. So I'm very excited today to be joined by Patrick Sheedy and Dan Harris, both principals at Borealis Strategic Capital Partners, a Chicago-based hedge fund seeding platform. Prior to the inception of Borealis in 2017, Dan, Patrick and the investment team were senior members of the investment team at Aurora, which was a fund of funds that was founded in 1988 and grew to $14 billion at its peak.

At Aurora, almost 40% of all the managers they invested in were in their first year of existence. They were early investors in names like Citadel, Appaloosa, Edgerton- some of the biggest names in the hedge fund industry today. So, given their decade-long experience and expertise in early-stage manager research and investing, I thought they'd be perfect to join us for this discussion so they can share some of their valuable experience with you today.

So I just said in my intro that we're big believers in early-stage alpha. I also noted the challenges, and if not done properly, it can be risky, given the lack of hard evidence of the ability to run a successful business or a track record.

To start the discussion off with a blunt question, and I guess a somewhat loaded question, investing in early-stage managers, is it really worth it?

[Borealis] The short answer is yes. The reason is early-stage managers outperform. That's in some ways a truism that works across asset classes.

There's a lot of data out there in the long-only mutual fund world across equity and fixed income that evidence that early in those life cycles of those funds, the managers outperform. When you look in private markets, funds one and two versus subsequent funds often outperform. Within hedge funds, our experience at Aurora, making numerous early-stage hedge fund investments, those funds performed really well and outperformed the rest.

But we wanted to be more objective in this. And so we did a research project. We looked at an analysis of the full hedge fund universe to see if the similar pattern exists that exists in other asset classes.

Do the early-stage managers within the hedge fund world outperform? And the evidence was yes. We looked at over 3000 funds that are tracked by Pivotal Path, which is a large data provider. And within those 3000 funds, it includes nearly a thousand that are no longer in business.

We really liked that data set as it helped mitigate some of the survivorship bias that can exist in these types of studies. And looking at all of those funds, the funds that survived versus the funds that have failed, within the first 36 months of a manager's track record, that first 36-month period outperformed on an annualized basis by nearly 400 basis points relative to the full track record.  

We know that when you take averages, it can sometimes let the right tails or left tails skew results. So we also looked at the median of the data set. And the median outperformance was over 200 basis points. So from that, our conclusion was, yes, there's real outperformance around this, particularly in the hedge fund space.

We also looked at the risk profile. We looked at the volatility as a measure of risk and looked at the annualized volatility of that first 36-month period, and compared that to the full track record. The annualized vol was actually slightly less than the full track record.

So not only was the absolute return better within that early 36-month period, but also on a risk adjusted basis, those returns were better. And then finally, which is a little more nuanced for us as backers looking to find those managers that can outperform and that will build lasting businesses. We looked at the characteristics of those nearly 2000 funds that are still in business and thriving versus the 1000 that didn't make it.

And we looked at the return and risk profile of those managers, particularly within that first 36-month period. Not surprisingly, the managers that survived had better returns in the first 36-month period. But what was interesting is that those managers also took more risk than those that didn't survive.

So the funds that failed often didn't take enough risk to generate the returns to build a lasting business. And that part I think is a little more nuanced and something that's really helpful for us and helpful for anybody who's looking at early-stage managers and trying to assess whether that manager is suited to take an appropriate level of risk to generate returns.

[BridgeWood] It's probably not surprising to investors on the call today to learn that the returns of early-stage managers are higher.

Although I think the quantum of dispersion might be surprising. That is significant outperformance. But I think your comments on volatility and risk are very interesting and surprising. Can you expand a little bit more on those two points?

[Borealis] First, I think people are maybe worried about investing in early-stage managers because they believe it's risky.  As the data indicates, it’s not necessarily risky from a portfolio track record volatility perspective. Maybe it's risky as an allocator to invest in them in case it doesn't work out. But from a pure risk return perspective, it's not riskier. And when you're assessing a manager and looking at their ability to manage risk, it's important to try and find managers that can manage risk but not mitigate risk. Managers need to take enough risk to generate returns.

That risk just needs to be allocated and directed in a way that is put behind their capabilities so they can generate the returns that are attractive enough to build lasting businesses. One other thing that was somewhat surprising, or more interesting, is that across those 3,000 funds, we were able to look at each of the managers by their strategy classification (looking at the hedge fund strategies like long/short equity, credit, multi-strat, macro, etc.

We wanted to see if there was potentially one strategy where the longer track records outperformed the early track records. However, across all strategies, it was the first 36 months outperformed, no matter what strategy we looked at. I think there's a notion out there that credit managers in particular, having longer track records, having more scale, allows them to outperform the smaller, perhaps newer managers, and that just wasn't so in the data.

The first 36 months of the credit universe outperformed by nearly 420 basis points on average. There are situations where maybe it's a high-profile creditor-on-creditor violence type of situation where a credit manager with scale is able to push around a smaller manager. But net-net, when you take it across a broader opportunity set and being invested in an early-stage credit manager, those managers still outperformed relative to the longer-dated track records.

[BridgeWood] What do you think causes the outperformance?

[Borealis] I'd say there are a few reasons for it. Again, probably some obvious, some less obvious, some portfolio-related, some behavioral.

First, the portfolio-related, and perhaps on the obvious side, is a manager who's just getting going. Maybe they're launching with 100 million or so, which is obviously a lot of money in absolute terms, but relative to other managers that are out there, it's a nimbler portfolio. They're running 100 million, they have a broader opportunity set. They can essentially invest in all of the trades that are available within their universe.

Contrasting that with a larger manager, of course, the opportunity set narrows as perhaps they get crowded out of smaller trades or it's harder for them to move in and out of things. So there's that, which I flag as a more obvious observation. Also, when the manager launches, they've often been putting their business together, they've had time to research their portfolio and opportunity set, and they're often launching with a purpose.

They left a previous firm because they wanted to exploit an opportunity where they felt their skills were very well-suited. And once they come out and they start investing, they have a very well-researched portfolio where most likely everything in that book is very intentional and has a real reason. There is no inertia in the portfolio, which can sometimes harm managers as their books season and there are names in the book that don't really belong there anymore.

Here with a new clean portfolio, it's perhaps easier for them to be very intentional with the way they're deploying risk. And I'd say on the behavioral element, when a manager is launching, they're an entrepreneur. So whether it be within the hedge fund universe or starting a software business or a retail business as an entrepreneur, you're going to get the best of that person when they're getting going.

This is their baby, they want it to succeed, and they know how important it is for it to work. And so, investing with a manager at that point in their life cycle, you're likely getting the best of them, the most focused, their most care, attention and time, which I think also helps to make the performance better. And then kind of along with that, they also generally have a nimble team. As they're getting going, they're hiring people that are additive to the process, the bare bones resources they need to get going. And what's important about that is the PM who's launched a startup, their own firm, they aren't typically at the outset managing a large team.

So the talent at the portfolio manager level with that person isn't watered down across a large team. It's really distilled; their abilities are being translated very directly into the portfolio. I think that's another reason that helps to lead to the portfolio performance being better than those longer dated fund track records.

[BridgeWood] In addition to the white paper that Dan just referenced, you also recently sent out your annual summary of the hedge fund new launch landscape. Can you give us a little color on this current new launch landscape?

[Borealis] Sure. It's obviously something we monitor very closely. This new launch landscape is in fact our investable universe.

And going back to our time, even before Borealis, we've always sorted through many launches. And over the last five years or so, we've published this annual report entitled new launch landscape just with a different year. A couple of observations.

First and foremost, the number of launches ebbs and flows. Market dynamics, hedge fund industry trends and other factors do affect the number. And under the surface, what we have observed in recent years is there's a new normal.

And that new normal is somewhere between 300 and 500 launches per year. Over the last couple of years, it's been between 350 and 400. And we do our best to cover and assess as many of those as possible.

One clear takeaway over the course of 2025 is the increase in number of launches coming out of the multi-manager pods or multi-manager platforms, which is not surprising given the growth and prominence of those platforms.

There's more capital there, and more people there. And it's relatively intuitive to see an increase in the number of launches that have come from those pedigrees. Also under the surface, we've observed an uptick in quantitative and or systematically focused investment strategies, a downward trend in ESG related launches or firms that apply some form of ESG analysis or lens to their strategy.

And then one other observation is the increase in separately managed accounts as a form of capital helping managers get going. So just a bit of a preview of what we've seen over the last now 13 months or so.

[BridgeWood] I'm sure all these new launches claim to have a definable or differentiated edge. And a lot of investors use track record to analyze and determine that edge. How do you find “edge” without a track record or any hard evidence that the manager is not only a good investor, but can also successfully run a business? What are the intangibles that you focus on, and in general, how are you able to sort through the many managers efficiently and effectively to find the few that you want to do that deep dive on to see whether they're worthy of your and your investors' capital?

[Borealis] First of all, we do understand why investors prefer a track record. However, we think a track record can actually be a crutch for investors or prospective investors because in that series of monthly returns or data points, it's pretty easy for an investor to draw the bullseye around the bullet hole and develop a thesis informed primarily through the historical performance.

While it's comfortable to do it that way, we have observed there are qualitative data points that if extracted consistently and thoughtfully on these new launches where there isn't a track record, we found some really nice frameworks and aspects of these people, their pedigrees and their strategies that we think inform our view on managers that can go on to a lot of success. So qualitative data points on the person- that's where we start. We are backing people.

As in any partnership, we need to partner with good people. So we spend a lot of time getting to understand the person, what makes him or her tick, really trying to define whether or not they are trustworthy partners, worthy of our capital. It isn't necessarily their professional pedigree in that way or reputation, but even personally.

If we have reason to believe we can't trust someone based on previous personal or professional behaviors or actions, it's a very quick pass for us. We need these people to really know what the difference is between right and wrong and have a proven record of carrying that out in their life and work. We like humble people. We obviously need confident people, but there is such a thing as being humbly confident or confidently humble. And we really like to tease that out of managers.

And it's okay for managers to say, I don't know. I don't know can be a very good thing to believe because it probably means you know what you do know and you're wise enough to acknowledge strengths and weaknesses or aspects of your own prospective business that you should be focused on or shouldn't be focused on. A few examples to bring this to life.

I know we all have our own war stories on manager due diligence, but there's a particular situation that comes to mind. I will not name this individual, but he checked out wonderfully well professionally. A really neat trading strategy, a really marketable sort of persona that we thought was really, really compelling. However, through our reference checking process, we found out that personally away from the trading desk, he had a pretty mixed reputation and had not treated certain of his partners in life the right way.

This was a really easy pass for us when we got to that data point. And it literally had nothing to do with his investment abilities or prospects, but it was something that we ran away from pretty quickly.

Another important part of the person is that they have to be aligned with us in terms of their goals and motivations, including the timeframe during which they plan to achieve those goals and motivations. We need people that are at the right point in their career, personally and financially, to make good long-term greedy decisions. And we've had experiences with managers that are in a little bit of a hurry. They want to make those returns and gather those assets a little more quickly than we feel is practical or reasonable.

That's a good thing to tease out of these managers. Try to understand what they're trying to build, how and when, and make sure it is achievable and consistent with whatever your mandate is as it relates to the right managers for your portfolio.

Another aspect that we spend a lot of time on is pedigree. And pedigree to us is not necessarily where you went to school and where you worked. Rather, it's trying to extract the difference between what is attributable to the person and the seat from which that person is leaving to start a new firm. So we spend a lot of time trying to find people that have likely been the number two or number three at reputable hedge funds, where they not only had exposure to investment decisions and learned to appreciate how finite capital is, but they also had exposure to certain non-investment realities of running a hedge fund business. We find, and we have data that supports this, that people that had exposure to non-investment functions are probably a little bit better equipped to go succeed on their own. And the natural place to sort of cite examples today is the multi-managers.

The multi-manager training grounds have spawned good talent. There's no doubt about it. However, for the most part, we observe that for people that come out of those firms, a lot of their historical success is in fact attributable to the seat- the business card, the email address, the access to whether it's management teams or data or systems or risk management, that is today's version of the seat. We're generally skeptical in terms of its ability to prepare people to do their own thing in terms of a startup hedge fund.

And then finally, strategy. Markets are competitive. We all know that. Competition for alpha is fierce. It's a very well-funded industry, and we really, really need people that are doing something differentiated.

There has to be a durability to the the source of alpha that they're trying to extract. We generally try to find people that are more “different” than they are “better”. We obviously want people that are very good at what they do, but if they are approaching a market or a sector looking through a different lens or with differentiated domain expertise in a unique corner of the market, we think their probability of generating a nice long-term sustainable return stream is higher.

And then finally, whatever the manager sets out to do, it better be authentic to their own skill set. We see too many managers pre-launch that are quite clearly trying to do something that they've seen somebody else do well, or that their previous firm did well. And they're building it more from a commercial tailwind perspective than they are building it around their own skillset.

I think back to one specific example, a talented manager that, as we got to know him pre-launch, showed us two or three different variations of his strategy, a long-only, a long-biased, and even a market-neutral variation. It was very clear that this individual did not have the confidence in his own skills to express authentically that which he was, he thought he could do better than others. He just wanted to build a product that fit the commercial demand.

That's a telltale sign of a situation we will run from based on the lack of authenticity in that specific situation.

[BridgeWood] Staying on the topic of the multi-strats and the multi-PM platforms providing anchors or seed capital to the newer managers and managers in general. Can you talk to both the pros and the cons of these types of arrangements for the manager, and also for you as an early-stage investor analyzing these managers?

[Borealis] This is a newer reality. These multi-manager pods are more actively farming money out externally. It's a product of the growth in assets and the scarcity of talent in a way. So we're seeing more of it.

I think the way we would advise investors is to really appreciate that this is a highly concentrated customer, to use a non-financial term. But these big multi-managers come in with their own motivations, their own terms, their own mandates, and they represent in certain new launches the entirety of the business. A regular way investor coming into those types of situations should be thoughtful about what they try to learn about the multi-manager provider of capital.

The multi-managers are very good at hiring, firing, hiring and firing people. It's part of how their risk management works. There are quite a few examples even over the last six to 12 months where a big new launch was stood up with big support from one of the big multi-managers, and then six or 12 or 18 months later, it's pulled as quickly as it was allocated there because of a drawdown trigger or change in mandate.

So they're big, they're many, and as in any business, customer concentration is not a good thing. And investors should be mindful of that and try to better understand, try to understand how the manager presents it as a strength of their business.

[BridgeWood] This webinar is not about seeding per se, but just a question on that. As a seeder, are you competing with these platforms for the top new launches?

[Borealis] No, the short answer is we do not compete with the multi-managers for talent or alpha. First of all, on talent, we prefer the truly entrepreneurial, authentic, differentiated investor. And the alphas we prefer tend to be very different than those that the multi-managers are really good at pursuing and extracting.

A key difference is the multi-managers generally prefer liquid, scalable, “market-neutralable”- I'll term that here or use that word- but very hedge-able, tight risk constraints, all in search of very short-term alphas that are quite levered.

On the other hand, we like strategies that are a bit capacity-constrained, longer duration alphas, maybe with a more volatile return streams where managers can actually embrace volatility and use it to their advantage.

It's a very different segment of the market of people and strategies/alphas that we pursue. And as a result, we do not find ourselves competing with them.

[BridgeWood] Can you touch on the trends towards just SMAs in general versus fund investments?

[Borealis] It’s secular- they are here to stay. It's, we've seen more of them year over year. It makes sense for certain strategies and certain asset owners to implement their hedge fund portfolios via SMAs.

A lot of what I said about the multi-manager anchor or seed capital also applies here. Investors should really understand the terms of the SMA. Not all SMAs should be created equal. Some of them come from intermediaries of sorts. Some come from directly from asset owners and whether it's mandate, fees, liquidity, drawdown triggers, these are all very, very fair details that investors should make sure they understand as they consider investing alongside a manager with a big SMA, or even a small one, because small ones can require more back and middle office resources that might change the shape of an organization.

[BridgeWood] You discussed the benefits of the smaller and newer businesses, but what are some of the challenges of a small business or mistakes that a lot of small businesses and newer managers make, and what is some of the advice that you give to new managers that other early stage investors should suggest in their own conversations or to look out for?

[Borealis] Aside from providing capital and duration of capital, we play the role as advisor. And so whether it be us or another seeder or some other backer, I think it's important for a manager to have somebody that they can trust to give them straight, honest feedback. And that's the role that we provide.

It's the manager's first time doing this. It's not their first time trading the stocks within their universe or credit securities, but it is most likely their first time setting up a hedge fund. Our advice to them, keep it simple. Complexity kills. When you're building it right at the beginning, just do what's needed to allow you to best deploy your resources as a talented PM to the portfolio. The more bodies you add, the more portfolios you run, the more products you launch, it decreases the chance of success. It decreases the chance that you'll have exceptional performance that'll allow you to build the firm that you want.

So we really do guide them to keep it simple and look for managers who have that shared vision. Another thing is sometimes managers can be scared about turnover on their team. Nobody bats a thousand when it comes to hiring, they just don't. Pick your industry, you're just not going to get everything right. But what's important is if you realize it's not a good fit for both the person for your team or the team for that person, make a change. Otherwise you're operating below full capacity. It's really important that you have everybody on the team rowing and pulling in the right direction. In which case we very much encourage our managers, if it's not a fit, make a change and that's okay.

Do whatever you need to do to prioritize what's best for your portfolio and for the results and ultimately for your LPs.

[BridgeWood] So wrapping up my questions, what other advice would you give to LPs about vetting and partnering with early-stage managers that we haven't covered yet, Or any advice or lessons learned from your own journey? And what are the top two or three questions every investor should ask a manager?

[Borealis] There is no specific question or two or three to ask from our perspective. But what is important is asking the types of questions that allow you to really get to know that individual. And it's not even the questions themselves, but the setting. This is a partnership. When you make an investment, particularly a long-term investment with a manager, each group needs to know each other, know what their goals and aspirations are. And a part of that is getting the manager off the script. They will likely have a pitch deck of some sort and the bullet points that they want to talk through but get to know the person.

Doing it over Zoom or in person is fine, but maybe change the setting outside of a conference room and have a meal, have a coffee, have a drink, go for a walk. That's really important as far as building that trust and getting to know the true individual that you'll be investing with. We really encourage anybody who's investing with somebody, whether it be early stage, late stage, change the setting, change the tone of the conversation, make it so it's truly about getting to know each other and particularly you getting to know the manager.

And that's how you can really get to the true essence of who that person is. And then last thing, which was touched on earlier of, I don't know being a good answer. I think when we think about where early-stage managers might have missteps, it's thinking they know everything.

This quote has been said before: “it's not what you don't know that gets you in trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so”. I think you need to be very careful when you're considering investment to make sure you have somebody who you're partnering with who truly understands what they know and is very mindful of what they don't know, so they don't step into areas of the market or areas of the business that'll get them in trouble.

[BridgeWood] We do have a couple of questions that have come in from the attendees on the call. So I'll pose those. Discuss specific metrics used in the due diligence stage and how they think about it, or how you think about it. Sharp, correlation, vol, capture ratios, etc.

[Borealis] Our due diligence, we're speaking with managers. When it comes to the actual quantitative element of our due diligence, it's a bit different than the quantitative element of a due diligence for a manager that has a much longer track record. Our process is still quantitative.

We need to piece together the manager's historical trades. What were they attached to? What did they originate? What did they lead? What were they truly responsible for at their previous firm? Where did they create value in the form of a great investment idea or, hopefully, numerous and breadth of investment ideas? For that, though, that type of data, as we piece it together, doesn't lend itself quite as well to just calculating a sharp ratio on a backward-looking basis or an up-capture or down-capture. What we're looking for are folks who are based on the ideas they've originated.

The risk that they took was far outstripped by the returns that they generated from their ideas in the past. We want to find people who, predictably, on a forward-looking basis, will generate great sharp ratios, who will outperform the market in up environments and down markets. That comes from finding people who are these original thinkers who can come up with things that are different than what other people hold, have different investment theses, and are able to hold it for a duration that might be different than others in the market.

We certainly value those attributes, but we're looking for those who we can forecast and predict will generate those attributes because the data we're working with doesn't lend itself well to do it on a backward-looking basis.

[BridgeWood] What are some of the typical due diligence questions or focuses you think are overrated?

[Borealis] Well, track record, we called it a crutch. It's not overrated. There is really important information to be gleaned from historical track records, but I think part of what we're saying is, in fact, that track records can be overrated in assessing one's probability of success going forward.

I think pedigree as well, and the name of the firm. That carries a lot of weight, and sometimes I think it can lead to asset flows to a manager that perhaps aren't warranted. Sometimes it is too.

It's not that it should be ignored, but I think it is overrated a bit. Where that person got their first job, and if they just stuck around at a firm that turned out to be great, and they were an average contributor, that's why you need to really dig in, do the due diligence, call the references, talk to people who worked at that firm, and not just rest on the fact that they came from a gold-plated firm. Similarly, folks that really added value at a firm that's good but perhaps not great, those people shouldn't be discounted because they can be great as a standalone.

That's the process that I encourage anybody who's doing this to really embrace and dig in. It's about going that next layer deeper. That's the same with the track record.

The numbers are helpful, but you need to go a layer deeper in the track record. What is the source of it? Where did it come from? What was the process that led to all that? That's when the track record can come to life and be helpful, but a track record alone, like you said, can be misleading. One other item that ties a lot of this together is the amount of internal capital or personal capital that people are bringing to the table.

I think investors often crowd around new launches that are being backed by individuals that have made a lot of money over the course of their career. Now, that previous compensation can in fact be a sign of historical success, but oftentimes the previous compensation is a product of the seat and the quality of the seat that that person sat in more than it is their individual contribution and ability to build something special and unique on the outside. I think what we're citing here are all forms of inefficiency that we try to apply our skills to extract a little bit more about what this actual person did and what that might mean for the future rather than what the track record or compensation was or reputation of the hedge fund they've come out of. This is all opportunity for us, but things we see often and think about a lot.

[BridgeWood] What are the most important questions to ask in the due diligence stage from your experience, based on questions that revealed make or break during the due process?

[Borealis] One question that's important is asking the manager about their failures. What didn't work? One, it gets to the humility aspect of it. But two, do they feel like they can learn from their mistakes? Mistakes happen. Things don't go right all the time. And one, you need to acknowledge them. And two, you need to learn from it. And again, whether you're investing a manager at the beginning, right when they launch, or 10 years into their track record, they should hopefully always be learning.

And I think that question can uncover whether you have somebody who has a true growth mindset, or if they think they've already got it all figured out. And they have it all figured out, they probably don't, you probably want to stay away.

So we do like to ask that question “what's your biggest mistake?” But let's now talk about it. Let's get in the weeds. Let's see how introspective they are on that. So it's the follow-up questions on that.

Let's say another question is walk us through your career. Why'd you go to school there? Why'd you work there? Walk us through, was there an intentional aspect to what they were doing? Were they building to something? Or was it kind of just they floated, and they kind of went there because that's who offered them a job. And then they left because they kind of couldn't work there anymore.

So now they need to go somewhere else, or was it deliberate? And people are young, sometimes they float, and then they find the more deliberate path. But we want to find people who are very intentional and focused about what they want to do, and aren't just launching a fund or got to this position to launch a fund because they kind of didn't know what else to do. And I think as you kind of ask those questions, you're able to understand who they are, how they think about their career, what they're building towards.

Also, you're able to pick up some reference ideas along the way. When you're investing in early-stage managers, it's helpful to have a network that you can lean in on to call folks who have worked with them in the past. So a lot of times, oh, where'd you work? Oh, who'd you work for there? Okay, what were the reporting lines there? And we're taking notes along the way.

We might know people there. And as anybody's talking to somebody who's going through their career path, take note of where you might know people at those various stops. And when they don't show up on their reference list, and the reference list is, of course, curated to be a group of people who will say wonderful things, it gives you, the investor, some good ideas of who to call.

[BridgeWood] Thanks very much, Dan and Patrick. A lot of really good nuggets. This is clearly about the intangibles, people, and businesses. Good news for you, not something that AI is going to be able to take your jobs just quite yet! I really appreciate all the insights and look forward to continuing the journey.